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Section	 2	 explains	 the	 problem	 of	 undermining	 and	 three	 possi-
ble	responses.	Section	3	explains	the	indefeasibility	view,	and	section	



















































Perception	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 a	 perception	
that	x,	then	the	agent	is	rationally	required	to	believe	that	






Let	 me	 make	 some	 clarificatory	 comments	 about	 these	 rules.	 First,	












2.	 It	 is	 controversial	whether	 this	 rule	 requires	 a	 different	 treatment,	 as	 how	
things	look	is	not	a	psychological	attitude.	I	think	similar	rules	will	still	hold	
for	non-attitudinal	psychological	states,	but	it	won’t	matter	for	my	arguments.
3.	 Lewis	 formulated	 the	Principal	Principle	 in	 terms	of	 conditional	 epistemic	
probabilities	e.g.	Cr(A	|	Known	chance	of	A	 is	x	and	E)	=	x,	and	 I	do	not	
intend	 to	diverge	 from	this	version.	 I	have	used	a	conditional	 to	show	the	
similarity	to	the	other	rules.	More	on	this	in	section	7.
4.	 Narrow-scope	rules	have	the	form	[if	p	then	you	ought	to	believe	q].	A	wide-
scope	 rule	 would	 have	 the	 form	 ‘you	 ought	 to	 believe	 [if	 p	 then	 q]’.	 See	
Broome	(1999).
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without	 believing	 Testimony.	 So	 Elga’s	 argument	 against	 Testimony	
implicitly	assumes	that	rational	agents	are	never	Akratic.	




Returning	 to	 the	main	 thread,	 let’s	 distinguish	 three	 ways	 of	 re-




ity	 has	what	 Titelbaum	 calls	 “fixed	 points”	—	these	 are	 propositions	








develop	this	view	using	the	distinction	between	hedged and unhedged 
























Suppose	 that	 you	have	 a	 conciliatory	 view	on	disagree-




be	 pulled	 part	 way	 toward	 thinking	 that	 your	 friend	 is	
right.	In	other	words,	your	view	on	disagreement	requires	
you	to	give	up	your	view	on	disagreement.	(p.	179)
So	Testimony	 looks	unstable:	 if	Elga	 receives	 testimony	against	Tes-
timony,	 and	applies	Testimony,	he	must	give	up	Testimony.8	Concil-
iatory	 views	 sometimes	 call	 for	 their	 own	 rejection.	This	 is	 the	 self-
undermining	problem.

















Contributory End	of	section	6 Ross,	Christensen?	 
Section	5




Elga	 (2010)	 defends	 the	 first	 option	—	restriction	—	arguing	 that	 we	
need	to	make	a	modification	to	Testimony	to	make	 it	 immune	from	
defeat.	 Titelbaum	 (2015)	 builds	 on	 this	 and	 suggests	 that	 epistemic	
rules	have	the	following	form:13
Restricted Testimony:	 If	an	agent’s	situation	includes	testi-









15.	 The	original	 text	says	 “this	 rule”.	 I	assume	 ‘this	 rule’	 refers	 to	Testimony.	 It	
won’t	matter	much	if	 it	refers	to	Restricted	Testimony.	I	argue	that	holding	
such	rules	to	be	indefeasible	is	ad	hoc,	whatever	their	exact	content	is.	
16.	 I’ve	 added	 “If	 x	 contradicts	 Testimony,	 then	 ignore	 x	 and	 continue	 believ-
ing	 other	 testimony.”	 Titelbaum	 isn’t	 explicit	 about	 how	 to	 respond	 if	 x	
rules.11	Hedged	 rules	have	 ceteris	 paribus	 clauses,	 stating	 situations	







































and	 remain	 absolutely	 confident	 in	 its	 correctness,	 de-




reliable	 when	 I	 think	 about	 philosophy,	 nevertheless	




Given	 the	 difficulty	 of	 formulating	 rational	 rules,	 the	 claim	 that	we	
should	be	certain,	or	even	highly	confident,	of	what	they	are,	even	in	
the	face	of	opposing	arguments,	seems	to	me	untenable.





























Properly Restricted Testimony:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 in-
cludes	testimony	that	x,	the	agent	is	rationally	…	required	
to	believe	x	—	unless	x	 contradicts	 [a]	 truth	about	what	
rationality	requires.	(p.	274)
This	structure	is	intended	to	generalize	to	all	rules,	e.g.:
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This	 is	close	 to	saying	 that	 fundamental	 rules	are	 those	 that	are	not	
defeasible.	But	then	the	question	is:	Why	should	we	think	that	there	
are	any	such	rules?	Indeed	I	will	argue	that	there	are	none.
Elga	 argues	 that	 fundamental	 rules	 are	 dogmatic	 using	 the	 fol-
lowing	example:	Imagine	a	magazine,	Consumer Reports,	consistently	




cars	 is	 to	 put	 them	 forward	 as	 good	 recommendations.	
And	we	can’t	consistently	do	that	while	also	claiming	that	
contrary	 recommendations	 are	 superior.	 So	 our	 always	








ommendations	 can	be	defeated.	 Suppose	 the	 editor	 of	Consumer Re-
ports knows	that	her	rival	magazine	has	a	larger	budget	and,	as	a	result,	
makes	recommendations	based	on	more	evidence.	This	editor	should	
recommend	 that	 consumers	 rate	 this	 rival	magazine’s	 recommenda-
tions	over	those	of	Consumer Reports.	It	would	be	ad	hoc	for	the	editor	
to	ignore	evidence	against	her	magazine’s	recommendations.
It	 is	 only	 fundamental	 epistemic	 rules	 that	 are	 plausibly	 (non-ad-





rationality.	We	are	led	to	the	view	that	what seems like evidence doesn’t 
even count as evidence.	 Lasonen-Aarnio18	 is	 sympathetic	 to	 this	 view,	
writing	that	it	“rests	merely	on	a	desire	to	avoid	paradox”	(p.	342).	But	
this	position	seems	at	least	as	paradoxical	as	any	of	the	alternatives.
So	where	did	we	go	wrong?	 I	will	argue	 in	 the	next	 section	 that	
Elga’s	(2010)	 initial	move	to	a	restriction	on	Testimony	—	a	move	ex-
tended	by	Titelbaum	—	was	a	step	in	the	wrong	direction.	


















And	 she	 then	 says,	 “That	one	 should	believe	 that	one	 shouldn’t	φ	doesn’t	
entail	that	one	shouldn’t	φ”	(p.	343).	So	it	seems	Lasonen-Aarnio	does	accept	
that	 there	 is	 evidence	against	φ,	which	affects	higher-level	beliefs	but	not	
first-order	beliefs,	and	thus	she	accepts	Akrasia.






there	 is	 a	 residual	 bad-making	 feature	when	 they	 are	 not	 followed,	
even	when	not	following	them	is	the	right	thing	to	do	(due	to	other,	





depends	 on	 the	 overall	 weighting	 of	 these	 duties.	 In	 epistemology,	









(Assume	 for	now	that	 the	 rule	 is	unhedged.)	This	avoids	 the	under-
mining	problems	above.	An	agent	who	has	testimony	that	x	and	a	per-
ception	that	not	x	has	a	reason	to	believe	x	and	a	reason	to	believe	
not	 x.23	No	 paradox;	what	 they	 should	 believe	 depends	 on	 the	 cor-
rect	weighing	of	these	reasons.	And	an	agent	who	doesn’t	believe	that	
21.	 Frederick	uses	 ‘overridden’	but	 I	prefer	 ‘outweighed’,	which	makes	explicit	
that	they	still	have	weight.
22.	 Schaffer	2015	p.	659.











contributory	 rules	 in	epistemology.	 (Those	uninterested	 in	 contribu-
tory	rules	can	skip	the	next	section	without	loss	of	continuity.)	









Normally,	 if	Alf	has	the	duty	to	meet	Betty	 for	 lunch,	








is	 a	 fundamental	 rule,	 it	must	 be	one	 if	 Elga’s	 argument	 that	 fundamental	
rules	are	indefeasible	is	to	have	implications	for	conciliationism.	
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In	 the	 basic	 case,	 you	 are	 standing	 outside	 the	 library,	
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6. Hedged Rules 
Let’s	recap.	So	far	I	have	argued	that	it	is	ad	hoc	to	hold	that	simple	
epistemic	rules	are	indefeasible,	and	that	epistemic	rules	are	not	con-
tributory.	My	positive	view	is:	For any (simple or complex) epistemic rule, 
rational agents can acquire evidence that it is not a requirement of rationality, 




ample:	 if	Alf’s	promise	 to	Betty	was	made	under	 threat	of	 force,	his	
promise	 fails	 to	engender	 that	duty,	because	 the	 situation	was	duty-
voiding.	So,	starting	with	a	simple	ethical	rule:	
if	you	promised	to	p,	then	you	are	required	to	p








28.	This	 idea	 has	 been	 suggested	 in	meta-ethics	 by	Holton	 (2002)	 and	Horty	
(2007).	Horty	writes	 that	 “the	general	principle	 that	 lying	 is	wrong	should	
be	 taken	 to	mean	 simply	 that	 lying	 is	wrong	by	default	—	that	 is,	 to	 a	first	
approximation,	that	once	we	learn	that	an	action	involves	lying,	we	ought	to	
judge	that	 it	 is	wrong,	unless	certain	complicating	factors	 interfere”	(p.	23).	
Holton	suggests	 that	ethical	 rules	need	 ‘That’s	 it’	clauses	stating	 that	 there	











thereby	 prevented	 himself	 even	 from	 addressing	 the	
question	what	the	appropriate	response	is	to	such	a	thing.	
Normally	we	would	speak	of	 regret	and	 residual	duties,	
but	 if	 all	 conflict	 is,	 as	 Scanlon	 suggests,	merely	 appar-
ent,	 there	 are	no	defeated	 [outweighed]	 considerations	
capable	of	demanding	regret,	and	nothing	to	generate	a	
residual	duty.27	(Dancy	2004	p.	26)

















27.	 This	 argument	 is	 central	 to	 Dancy’s	 position.	 He	 later	 (p.	 28–9)	 rejects	
Holton’s	Principled	Particularism	for	the	same	reason.
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response,	I	suggest	that	the	agent	can	move	straight	to	a	stable	state	
in	which	 E	 has	 higher	 credence	 than	 before	 and	 that-Perception-is-
a-requirement-of-rationality-in-this-situation	has	lower	credence	than	
before.




is	 familiar	 in	ethics	and	philosophy	of	science.31	 It	 is	also	familiar	 in	
epistemology	—	it	is	the	strategy	suggested	by	Lewis	(1980)	regarding	
objective	chance	which	I	develop	in	the	next	section.	



















This	brings	 in	various	 features	which	aren’t	 relevant	 to	our	 concerns.	One	
that	 is	worth	mentioning	 is	 that	Lewis’s	 rule	 requires	 that	 agents	not	only	
have	credences	that	match	the	known	chances,	but	also	update	in	such	a	way	










dence	 that	Perception	 is	 a	 requirement	of	 rationality	 in	
this	situation	should	decrease.	
Where	 there	 is	moderate	 evidence	 that	 Perception	 is	 not	 a	 require-
ment	of	rationality	in	this	situation,	the	rational	agent	might	retain	a	
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to	 have	 credence	 of	 x	 in	 p,	 unless	 they	 have	 evidence-
inadmissible-relative-to-the-Credence-Chance-Link,	 or 






Like	 the	Credence-Chance	Link,	 this	needs	 to	have	exceptions	built	
in.	One	type	of	exception	occurs	when	the	agent	has	other	evidence	
against	x.	Perhaps	 the	agent	has	directly	 seen	 that	x	 is	 false;	 this	 is	





agent	 in	not	believing	 testimony	 inadmissible-relative-to-Testimony.	So	
Testimony	should	be	hedged	as	follows:
Hedged Testimony:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 tes-
timony	 that	 x,	 then	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 required	










34.	Objection:	 Our	 hedged	 simple	 rules	 will	 almost	 never	 apply.	 Hedged	
PP	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 full	 belief	 that	 the	
chance	 of	 p	 is	 x,	 then	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 required	
to	 have	 credence	 of	 p	 in	 x,	unless they have inadmissible 
evidence.	
But	there	is	a	second	type	of	inadmissible	evidence	that	has	not	been	
discussed	 in	 the	 objective	 chance	 literature	—	the	Credence-Chance	
Link	can	have	undercutting	defeaters.	There	might	be	evidence	that	re-
duces	your	confidence	that	a	rule	is	a	requirement	of	rationality.33	Sup-





Similarly,	 suppose	an	apparently	 reliable	agent	 tells	you	 that	 the	
PP	 is	 false	 (i.e.	 even	with	 the	hedge).	 Then	 you	 should	 lower	 your	
credence	that	PP is	a	rule	of	rationality.	So	PP	also	needs	to	be	hedged.	
Just	 as	 the	 hedge	 of	 the	Credence-Chance Link	 generated	 the	 PP,	we	
need	a	new	principle	generated	by	the	hedge	of	the	PP.
One	way	 to	systematize	all	 this	 is	 to	make	 the	concept	of	admis-
sibility	relative	to	a	rule.	So	we	can	restate	PP	as:
PP*:	 If	 an	 agent’s	 situation	 includes	 full	 belief	 that	
the	 chance	 of	 p	 is	 x,	 then	 the	 agent	 is	 rationally	 re-

































Hedged, Contributory:	 If	 it	 looks	red,	then	you	have	a	rea-
son	to	believe	it	is	red,	unless	you	rationally	believe	you	
have	recently	taken	a	drug,	etc.
The	stronger	Hedged,	Absolute	 rule	 looks	plausible,	 so	 I	 tentatively	
endorse	it.	






















I	 don’t	 know	 if	 this	 is	 possible,	 so	 I	will	 concede	 the	 point,	 and	












one	person	and	helping	another.”	 I	 take	 it	Dancy	 intended	 to	describe	 the	
example	I	use.
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Suppose	 we	 specify,	 for	 every	 possible	 evidential	 situ-
ation	 in	which	 an	 agent	may	 find	 herself,	what	 the	 ap-
propriate	 doxastic	 response	 is.	 The	 result	would	 be	 an	









against	 it.38	 Let	 me	 sketch	 a	 way	 of	 thinking	 about	 rationality	 that	
makes	an	Uber-rule	plausible.	Instead	of	thinking	about	rationality	as	
emerging	out	of	simple	rules,	think	of	the	Bayesian	approach	where	
agents	 begin	 with	 a	 prior	 distribution	 of	 probabilities.	 Imagine	 all	
epistemically	possible	worlds	on	a	vast	Venn	diagram.	Bayesians	only	
allow	 updating	 by	 conditionalization	 (or	 Jeffrey	 conditionalization),	
37.	 Compare	Holton	(2002)	and	McKeever	and	Ridge	(2006	p.	16).
38.	Christensen	(2010,	2013),	Lasonen-Aarnio	(2014).





















So	we	could	be	guided	by	 the	Uber-rule	by	paying	attention	 to	 the	
most	important	parts	of	the	rule	for	our	situation.	























rule	 is	a	very	awkward	candidate	 for	a	rule	that	 is	 itself	
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[A]ssume	that	you	are	staring	at	a	chart	representing	the	



















who	 speaks	 the	 truth.	 So	 ‘epistemology	 oracle’	 cannot	 be	 correctly	
applied	to	anyone	who	tells	us	the	Uber-rule	is	incorrect	(under	any	
mode	of	presentation),	as	the	Uber-rule	is	by	definition	correct.
















than	Huckleberry	Finn	can	 formulate	 the	ethical	 rules.	But	 it	 is	pos-
sible	that	his	compassion	makes	him	perform	the	right	action,	so	there	
is	a	sense	in	which	he	is	guided	by	ethical	rules.	Similarly,	it	is	possible	
that	 our	 good	 sense,	 or	 epistemic	 intuition,	makes	us	 form	 rational	
beliefs,	so	there	is	a	sense	in	which	we	are	guided	by	the	Uber-rule.44 
To	sum	up,	although	the	Uber-rule	is	incompatible	with	some	views	













































	 The	difference	can	be	put	 in	 terms	of	 the	scope	of	 the	quantifiers.	For	any	














































violate	 [Anti-Akrasia]”	 (p.	 93).	The	example	 shows	how	we	 can	doubt	 the	
Uber-rule	without	Akrasia.

















belief	 change,	 due	 to	 his	 rejection	 of	 the	 analytic/synthetic	 distinc-
tion.)	Whereas	I	am	happy	to	talk	about	propositions	and	inclined	to	















52.	 Alternatively,	 perhaps	 analytic	 sentences	 can	be	 rejected	 in	 the	 sense	 that	
they	are	believed	to	fail	to	usefully	apply	to	the	world.	For	example,	one	can	
No	matter	how	much	of	 the	world	we	describe,	 it	 is	not	 enough	 to	










9. Against Certainty 
I	argued	in	the	previous	section	that	even	the	Uber-rule	can	be	ratio-
nally	doubted.	This	supports	a	view	associated	with	Quine	—	that	no	
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